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Abstract
We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the
union can strike or continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of
dispute activity and the form the disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive,
because of low unemployment or a real wage drop during the prior contract. We test these predictions by estimating
logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for U.S. labor contract negotiations from 1970 to 1989.
We find empirical support for the model's key predictions, but these associations are weaker after 1981.
I. Introduction
In union contract negotiations in the U.S. and other countries, the union has two options if an
agreement has not been reached by the contract expiration date. The union can strike or it can continue to
work under the terms of the expired contract, which we call holdout. We present a strategic model of
wage bargaining based on Cramton and Tracy (1992) that includes this threat decision.
A main purpose of this and other bargaining models with private information is to understand why
we frequently observe costly disputes. 1 Rational and fully informed bargainers should be able to identify
an efficient agreement that reflects their strategic positions. If they can predict where they will settle after
a costly dispute, then what prevents them from settling at those terms today? Introducing private
information is a simple way of explaining costly disputes. If one or both of the parties has private
information about some aspect critical to the negotiations, then the incentive to misrepresent this
information leads to bargaining inefficiencies. For example, if the union is unsure about the firm's
willingness to pay, the firm has an incentive to understate this value. The firm can claim that times are
tough and that it cannot pay much, but the union will distrust the firm unless its claims can be made
credible.2 One means of convincing the union that times are tough is for the firm to withstand a long
strike. If the firm is highly profitable, it prefers to avert a strike by accepting a higher wage settlement; if
the firm is less profitable, it prefers to endure a strike in order to settle at a lower wage.3
Thus far, the economic literature has focused mostly on strikes, ignoring that the union actually
decides between two threats, strike or holdout (continuing to work under the terms of the expired
contract). In this paper, we highlight the important implications of the union's threat decision. Our main
result is that the union's threat decision is sensitive to economic and policy changes. These changes alter
the relative attractiveness of the threats, leading to shifts in the composition of disputes. The
attractiveness of the holdout threat is determined from what the workers get paid during a holdout,
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1 See Kennan and Wilson (1989; 1990; 1993) for surveys of bargaining models with private information and their relation to
strike data. See Card (1990a) and Kennan (1986) for surveys of the empirical results on strike activity.
2 A recent example appeared on the front page of the New York Times (28 October 1990), describing the negotiations between
New York City and its municipal workers. "At the core of the stalled New York City municipal labor talks is the union leaders'
growing distrust of the claims being made about the city's financial plight." One union leader said, "Every year under Mayor
Koch they forecast a deficit, yet every year we had a surplus." Another called the city budget director, "more full of it than a
Christmas turkey."
3 Anecdotal evidence for this story is found in the documentary, Final Offer, of the 1984 negotiations between General
Motors Canada and the United Auto Workers. During the fifth day of the strike, the union leaders are discussing whether they
should accept GM's most recent offer. One leader said, "You might convince me that that's all there is after a month, but not after
five days." Another representative said, "If they think it will take a short strike to convince workers to accept, they're wrong."
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namely the current wage under the expired contract. Similarly, the attractiveness of the strike threat is
largely determined by the workers' outside employment options. This leads to two predictions of the
model. First, if the real wage falls during the prior contract because of uncompensated inflation, then the
holdout threat becomes less attractive and we should observe a shift in the composition of disputes from
holdout to strike. Second, if the workers' outside employment opportunities improve because of a decline
in local unemployment, we should observe a similar shift in the composition of disputes: the strike threat
becomes more attractive, making strikes more likely to occur. These predictions are driven by shifts in
the composition of disputes resulting from the union's threat decision. They do not arise in a model in
which the strike threat is the union's only option. In a strike-only model, strike incidence is unaffected by
a drop in the real wage, and is only slightly affected by a decrease in local unemployment.
In theory, a holdout is a productive inefficiency without a strike caused by a breakdown of
cooperation. This breakdown can occur either before or after the contract expiration date, but since we do
not observe the actual date of breakdown, we define holdouts in terms of what we do observe   the
contract expiration date. We assume that holdouts begin one day after contract expiration. This is
motivated from a fact and a story. The fact is a strong deadline effect at the contract expiration date
(Cramton and Tracy 1992). The story is an implicit understanding that the parties maintain through
reputations. During a contract, both sides implicitly agree to cooperate with one another so long as the
contract is not broken. Once the contract has expired, the union is free to use its most effective bargaining
weapon to secure a favorable contract. The union can wait to apply the threat, but it is better off
employing the threat as soon as possible. Waiting simply postpones the bargaining gains.
To evaluate the implications of economic and policy changes on dispute activity, we fit the
parameters of our model to the descriptive statistics from a large sample of contract negotiations.
Creating this benchmark model permits us to make detailed predictions on how economic changes
influence dispute activity. Strike incidence is shown to be highly elastic to changes in the real wage and
in the workers' outside employment options. We test these predictions by estimating logistic models of
dispute incidence and dispute composition using data on major U.S. contract negotiations from 1970 to
1989. We find empirical support for the model's key predictions, but that these associations are much
weaker in the post 1981 period. An interpretation of these findings is that the threat of permanent
replacement in the post 1981 period may have diminished the attractiveness of the strike threat.
Section II reviews the model of wage bargaining from Cramton and Tracy (1992). Then in Section
III, we establish a benchmark case by fitting the parameters of the model to the descriptive statistics in
our sample. Section IV determines how sensitive the equilibrium outcome is to changes in the model
parameters. In Sections V and VI, we describe an empirical specification of our model and present
estimates of the determinants of dispute incidence and dispute composition. Section VII examines the
issue of whether a structural change in the empirical model occurred in the post 1981 period.
II. A Model of Wage Bargaining
Our model of wage bargaining is based on Cramton and Tracy (1992). A union and a firm are
bargaining over the wage to be paid during a contract of duration T.4 The union's reservation wage is
common knowledge. Let v be the firm's value of the current labor force working under a contract of
duration T. The value v is known only to the firm, but it is common knowledge that v is drawn from the
distribution F with positive density on the interval [ l , h].
Bargaining begins with the union selecting a threat θ ∈ {H, S}, either holdout or strike, which
applies until a settlement is reached.5 In the threat θ, the payoff to the union is xθ and the payoff to the
4 For simplicity, we analyze a single contract negotiation. Thus we ignore any linkages with other negotiations, either over
time or within the industry. Also, the contract length T is assumed fixed. A more realistic model would relax these strong
assumptions, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 We are assuming that the threat decision is made on the day the contract expires and remains in place until an agreement is
reached. Cramton and Tracy (1993) allows for the possibility of switching threats during a dispute. For example, the union may
adopt a strike deadline in which it initiates a strike after a period of holdout. Although a majority of strikes in our data begin
within two days of the contract expiration, transitions from holdout to strike are common as well. We ignore lockouts because
they are rarely observed in our data. Only 3% of work stoppages are lockouts.
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firm is yθ(v) = aθv - bθ, where aθ ∈ [0,1) and bθ ≥ 0. The term 1 - aθ, which we call the dispute cost,
measures how far the parties are from the Pareto frontier during the threat θ. We define cθ = (bθ - xθ)/(1 -
 aθ) to be the relative payment difference during the threat θ: what the firm pays less what the union gets
divided by the dispute cost. Since the total payoff in agreement is v and the total payoff in the threat is
aθv - bθ + xθ, the pie that the parties are bargaining over is (1 - aθ)v + bθ - xθ = (1 - aθ)(v + cθ). We assume
that this pie is positive for all v ∈ [ l , h], which implies cθ > - l .
Let w0 be the current wage under the expired contract. Under U.S. labor law, the workers are paid
the current wage w0 during a holdout, so bH = xH = w0 and cH = 0. We assume there is some inefficiency
associated with a holdout: aH < 1. This inefficiency can come from several sources. (1) During a holdout
the workers have an incentive to slow down or "work to rule"   work exactly according to the rules of
the expired contract and no more. There are frequent discussions of this in the press.6 (2) The work rules
of the expired contract may be inefficient due to technology changes during the prior contract.7 (3)
Customers and suppliers may be reluctant to deal with the firm after contract expiration, because of the
disruption that a potential strike might cause.8 It would be difficult to measure the holdout inefficiency
precisely (or the strike inefficiency for that matter). Our main result, however, that strike and holdout
incidences are sensitive to economic and policy changes, holds regardless of the size of the holdout
inefficiency. For all values of aH, the union is faced with a choice between the strike or holdout threats.
The tradeoffs involved in that choice critically depend on economic and policy variables.
An outcome of the bargaining, denoted 〈t,w,θ〉, specifies the time of agreement t ∈ [0, T], the
contract wage w at the time of agreement, and the threat θ ∈ {H, S} before agreement. We assume that
the union and firm are risk neutral and that the payoff flows, both during the threat and after agreement,
are constant over time.9 The overall payoffs, then, are calculated as a combination of the threat payoff
and the agreement payoff, weighted by the fraction of time spent in each outcome, as shown in Figure 1.
Define
6 One recent example is the contract negotiations between American Airlines and its pilots, who used a number of tactics to
reduce productivity during negotiations. These tactics included: (1) sickouts during busy periods, resulting in canceled flights, (2)
last minute arrival, resulting in delayed flights, (3) lowering landing gear early and flying at lower altitudes to waste fuel, and (4)
refusing to do visual landings, thereby requiring a longer approach, which wastes fuel and time. American Airlines placed a full-
page add in the New York Times on 7 January 1991 to apologize to its passengers inconvenienced by these job actions.
7 A production inefficiency at the Daily News is a good example. New presses needed only eight operators. The work rules,
however, required that there be thirteen operators at each press (New York Times, 28 October 1990).
8 In the week prior to the 30 June 1990 contract expiration at U.P.S., customers were warned by union employees that
packages might not be delivered, because of the possibility of a strike after the contract expiration. As a result, some customers
switched to other carriers until a contract was signed.
9 Time-varying threats are considered in Cramton and Tracy (1993). Such threats are important to study, since threat payoffs
often do change during a dispute. For example, during a strike, production might be low initially, but then increase as the firm
hires and trains replacement workers. Time-varying threats can significantly affect the bargaining outcome. However, the basic
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FIG. 1.— Payoffs from bargaining outcome 〈t,w,θ〉
to be the discounted fraction of time spent in dispute if agreement occurs at time t, where r is the
discount rate. Then given the outcome 〈t,w,θ〉, the union's payoff is
U t w x D t w D t( , , ) ( ) ( ( )),θ θ= + −1
and the firm's payoff is
V t w y v D t v w D t( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )).θ θ= + − −1
After the union's threat choice, the union and firm alternate wage offers, with the union making the
initial offer. After an offer is made, the other side has two possible responses: (1) a counteroffer, in which
case the bargaining continues, or (2) acceptance, in which case the bargaining ends with labor supplied at
the offered wage for the remainder of the contracting period T. As in Admati and Perry (1987), a
bargainer can delay responding to an offer. This assumption leads to the signaling equilibrium in which
the firm signals its value through its willingness to delay agreement.10 For simplicity, we assume that the
minimum time between offers is arbitrarily small. This is the interesting case, since in practice one
observes a minimum time between offers that is small relative to plausible discount rates. Moreover, in
the signaling equilibrium we derive, the outcome is insensitive to the assumed time between offers.
The equilibrium takes a simple form. If w0 is sufficiently low (below an indifference level) the union
decides to strike; otherwise (w0 ≥ ~w  ) the union decides to hold out. The indifference level depends on r,
T, F, and the threat payoffs (xθ, yθ) for θ = {H, S}. A second indifference level m ∈ ( l , h) is determined
by the union's initial offer. The firm accepts the union's initial offer if its valuation is above m and
otherwise rejects the offer.
The signaling equilibrium is characterized in the following three propositions from Cramton and
Tracy (1992). First we look at the subgame after a threat θ ∈ {H, S} is chosen.
PROPOSITION 1. Let θ = (xθ, yθ) be the threat chosen by the union. In the limit as the time between
offers goes to zero, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following form:
1. The union makes an immediate offer of wθ(m) = xθ + ½(1 - aθ)(m + cθ), where m(cθ) ∈ ( l , h)
maximizes
10 The same equilibrium can be derived from the more standard Rubinstein (1982) extensive form with a fixed time between
offers (Ausubel and Deneckere 1991). We focus on the signaling equilibrium because it is simple and has desirable qualitative
properties.
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2. The firm accepts the offer if v ≥ m. Otherwise, if v < m, the firm waits until (m-v)/(m+cθ) of the
contract period has passed before offering wθ(v) = xθ + ½(1 - aθ)(v + cθ), which is accepted immediately
by the union.
3. The union's expected payoff from the threat θ is Uθ, the firm's expected payoff is Vθ, and the
expected loss is Lθ, where
For a given threat θ, we can determine how dispute incidence and duration respond to changes in the
threat θ or to changes in the distribution of v. The following proposition says that dispute activity
increases with uncertainty. Dispute activity also increases when the threat θ becomes more attractive to
the union (cθ falls).
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that m(cθ) uniquely maximizes (1). Dispute incidence F(m(cθ)) and dispute
duration D(v, cθ) = (m(cθ) - v)/(m(cθ) + cθ) increase as cθ decreases. Likewise, dispute incidence and
dispute duration increase with a linear, mean-preserving spread of the distribution F.
Dispute activity in this model depends on the amount of uncertainty about private information.
Interestingly, there is no necessary relationship between dispute activity and the bargaining inefficiency
1 - aθ. When cθ = 0, as is true for the holdout threat, both dispute incidence and duration are invariant to
changes in aθ. This is in contrast to the joint cost hypothesis (Kennan 1980; Reder and Neumann 1980),
which posits that disputes should be less frequent and shorter when they are more costly. A weakness of
the joint cost hypothesis is that it fails to identify the benefits of the dispute. Rather, it implicitly assumes
that these benefits remain fixed as costs vary. In contrast, our model of wage bargaining explicitly
captures both the costs and the benefits of the dispute. We find that the benefit to the firm of a longer
dispute (a lower wage) necessarily changes as the bargaining cost 1 - aθ varies.
Our third proposition demonstrates that the threat decision critically depends on the current wage.
PROPOSITION 3. If w0<
~w , the union strikes; if w0≥
~w , the union chooses to hold out, where
~ ( )( ( ) )[ ( ( ))] ( )( ( )[ ( ( ))]w x a m c c F m c a m F ms S S S S H= + − + − − − −1 1 1 0 1 0  and m(cθ) maximizes (1).
In fitting the model to the data, we must recognize that in any year some unions choose the strike
threat, while other unions choose the holdout threat. This can be accommodated in the model by
introducing heterogeneity over the parameter w0. (With a sequence of contracts, heterogeneity over w0
would arise naturally from past realizations of v.) In particular, suppose that w0 is drawn from the
distribution G. Then from Proposition 3, the strike threat is chosen if w0≤
~w , which occurs with
probability G( ~w ); otherwise, the holdout threat is chosen.
III. The Benchmark Model
We now turn to an example in which both v and w0 are uniformly distributed, so we can explicitly
calculate the equilibrium outcome as a function of the parameters.11 Our purpose is to determine
benchmark values for the parameters such that the equilibrium outcome fits the descriptive statistics of
collective bargaining in the U.S. over the last twenty years. We begin by determining the equilibrium
11 We have calculated the equilibrium with other distributions such as the truncated normal and extreme value distributions;
the results are similar. The advantage of the uniform distribution is that the equilibrium strategies can be calculated analytically.
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with uniform uncertainty.
Proposition 4. In the equilibrium with uniform uncertainty, the union selects the strike threat if w0 ≤ 
~w
where
The union's initial offer wθ(m(cθ)) is accepted by the firm if v ≥ m and otherwise rejected.
Once the preferred threat and the initial offer are determined, it is a simple matter to calculate other
features of the equilibrium and show how the equilibrium outcome changes as we vary the parameters of
the model. We assume that v is uniform on 1 ± µ, so that v has a mean of 1 and a variance of µ2/3. Thus,
increasing µ represents a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of v. We refer to µ as the level of
uncertainty for µ ∈ [0,1]. For calculations that depend on r and T, we assume an interest rate of 10% and
a contract length of 2.7 years, the mean contract length in our sample. We assume a 25% decline in
productivity during a strike (aS = 75%). This is roughly consistent with a union wage differential of 14%
(Lewis 1986), since the union gets a premium of about one-half of the inefficiency it can impose on the
firm. We suppose that w0 is uniformly distributed on W0 ± λ. We will choose W0 to approximate the
empirical strike incidence, assuming λ = 0.05.
Table 1 shows dispute incidence and duration for large bargaining units (>1000 workers) in the U.S.,
based on 5,002 contract negotiations from 1970 to 1989.12 We will use this data to determine benchmark
levels for the model parameters. A feature of the model is that the holdout duration depends only on the
level of uncertainty µ. A holdout duration of 32 days implies that µ = 0.07. Given µ, strike duration
depends only on cS. To fit a strike duration of 32 days, we set cS = 0.
13 McConnell (1989) using U.S. data
estimates a 3% decline in wages per 100 days of strike.14 For the model to generate this 3% wage decline
we need to set xS = 0.35. To fit the observed strike incidence of 10%, we set W0 = 0.48, so w0 ranges from
0.43 to 0.53 with λ = 0.05. Finally, we set aH = 96% to yield a nominal wage change conditional on
agreement of 5.3%, the observed value in McConnell's data. With the parameters set at these benchmark
levels, the implied dispute incidence is 52%. The dispute incidence observed in the data is 57%. We will
use this benchmark in the next section to examine the sensitivity of the equilibrium to changes in the
model parameters.
12 See McConnell (1989) and Cramton and Tracy (1992).
13 We use a strike duration of 32 rather than 27 days to account for the period of holdout that sometimes proceeds a strike.
The median holdout duration prior to a strike is 26 days. When we extend the model to allow for strike deadlines (Cramton and
Tracy 1993), we find that the hazard rate during the holdout before the strike is about 1/5th the hazard rate after the strike. Hence,
a holdout duration of 26 days before a strike is roughly equivalent to 5 days of strike.
14 In contrast, Card (1990b) using Canadian data finds no relationship between wages and strike duration.
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Table 1















NOTE.– Holdout = contract is ratified without a
strike more than 1 day after contract expiration.
Strike = strike occurs before contract signed.
Dispute = either strike or holdout occurs before
contract is signed. Strike duration does not include
holdout day prior to the strike. Dispute duration
includes holdout days prior to the strike.
We define any contract ratified without a strike more than one day after the contract expiration as a
holdout. This definition allows one day for ratifying a contract signed on the contract expiration date.
Neither the benchmark nor our results are significantly affected by requiring a longer leadtime (say 3 to 6
days) before identifying a holdout. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, with a longer leadtime our model fits the
data more closely. Increasing the minimum number of days before a negotiation is classified as a holdout
has the effect of decreasing the actual holdout and dispute incidences, and increasing the actual holdout
and dispute durations.
Table 2
Observed and Estimated Dispute Activity with Alternative Definitions of Holdout
                  Incidence (%)                           Median Duration (Days)         
      Holdout             Dispute            Holdout             Dispute      
Estimated


















































































Note.—Benchmark is in italic type. Parameters are defined in text.
IV. Sensitivity of the Equilibrium to Changes in the Model Parameters
Table 3 displays the elasticity of the equilibrium outcomes with respect to each of the model
parameters. The first row, labeled x, gives the parameter values at the benchmark. The first column,
labeled y, gives the equilibrium outcome at the benchmark in terms of empirical observables (incidence,
duration, settlement rate, wage change, and wage decline) and welfare measures (union share, firm share,
and the loss caused by dispute activity). Duration is the median duration in days. The settlement rate is
the initial hazard rate (i.e., the hazard rate at the beginning of the dispute) from the indicated threat to
settlement in percent per week. The wage change is the mean wage change conditional on the indicated
event. For example, conditional on immediate agreement, the nominal wage increases on average by
5.3%. The wage decline is the mean wage decline per 100 days duration of the indicated threat. Each cell
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of the table gives the elasticity of the outcome y with respect to the parameter x, i.e., (dy/dx)(x/y).
Elasticities that are exactly 0 are left blank.
The most prominent feature of the table is how sensitive the composition of disputes is to changes in
the parameters. The fraction of negotiations in which the union prefers the strike threat is 20% in the
benchmark, but this is highly elastic to changes in the holdout threat (aH and W0) or in the strike threat
(aS, xS, and bS). This is intuitive. As the relative attractiveness of the strike threat improves (an increase in
aH, xS, or bS, or a decrease in aS and W0), the composition of disputes shifts in favor of strikes. This shift
in the chosen threat causes holdout and strike incidences to vary in opposite directions, as exhibited by
the large elasticities for strike and holdout incidences and the 0.0 elasticities for dispute incidence.
Indeed, changes in holdout and strike incidences are almost entirely accounted for by shifts in the
composition of disputes. The elasticity of dispute incidence is negligible with respect to all the model
parameters, except µ for which the elasticity is 0.04. Dispute incidence is only directly affected by
changes in uncertainty. In contrast to holdout and strike incidences, holdout and strike durations are
insensitive to changes in the threat, but are significantly influenced by the amount of uncertainty.
These elasticity results have implications for the time-series data on contract negotiations. We
should expect to see: (1) holdout and strike incidences moving in opposite directions, (2) holdout and
strike durations moving in the same direction, and (3) dispute incidence varying less than holdout or
strike incidences. The basic time series properties in our data are given in Table 4, which presents dispute
incidence and duration by year. In 65% of the years, an above (below) average holdout incidence was
coupled with a below (above) average strike incidence. In 60% of the years, an above (below) average
holdout duration was coupled with an above (below) average strike duration. The standard deviation of
dispute incidence is roughly one-half that of the holdout and strike incidences. Regressing the log strike
incidence on the log dispute incidence and log dispute composition indicates that at most 14% of the
variance in strike incidence across years is accounted for by the variance in dispute incidence. The scaled
dispute incidence, shown in Figure 2, is roughly constant from 1970 to 1982 and then increases through
the rest of the decade (incidence for 1970 is not shown in the figure, because of the small number of
contracts in that year). In contrast, the strike incidence has wide fluctuations, ranging from 4% to 16%.
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Table 3
Elasticity of Equilibrium Outcomes with Respect to Model Parameters
Parameters
x = 96% 75% 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.05 0.07
y Outcomes aH aS xS bS W0 λ µ
20% Strike Threat
Incidence:
41% Holdout -5.8 4.5 -2.2 -2.2 6.0 -0.4 0.1
10% Strike 23.0 -18.1 8.8 8.7 -24.0 1.5 -0.1
52% Dispute 0.01 -0.01 0.04
Duration:
32 Holdout 1.0
32 Strike 1.5 -1.5 1.0
32 Dispute 0.3 -0.3 1.0
Settlement Rate:
11.0% Holdout -1.0
11.0% Strike -1.5 1.5 -1.0
11.0% Dispute -0.3 0.3 -1.0
Wage Change:
4.4% Holdout -21.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0
7.2% Strike -7.7 -5.4 2.6 2.6 -8.3 0.9 -0.1
5.3% Dispute -14.0 -3.8 1.8 1.8 -5.8 0.4 0.0
Wage Decline:
0.5% Holdout -21.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0
3.0% Strike -2.2 -1.8 1.0 0.0
1.0% Dispute 3.3 -10.3 3.3 5.0 -12.3 0.7 -0.1
Union's Share:
51% Holdout -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
47% Strike -0.8 0.4 0.4 0.0
51% Dispute -0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0
Firm's Share:
49% Holdout 0.5 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 0.0
52% Strike 0.7 -0.3 -0.3 0.0
49% Dispute 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.0
Loss:
0.08% Holdout -21.5 1.0
0.45% Strike -3.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
0.16% Dispute 2.2 -10.4 4.2 4.2 -11.5 0.7 0.9
NOTE.— v is uniform on 1 ± µ; w0 is uniform on W0 ± λ. First row, x, gives the parameter values at the benchmark. First column, y,
gives the equilibrium outcome at the benchmark. Each cell of table gives elasticity of outcome y with respect to parameter x =
(dy/dx)(x/y). If the elasticity is 0, the cell is left blank. Duration = median duration (days). Settlement Rate = initial settlement rate
(%/week). Wage Change = mean wage change conditional on event (%). Wage Decline = mean wage decline during threat (%/100
days).
Another interesting feature of the data is that the mean durations are all much longer than the
median durations. This is consistent with the model's high elasticity of duration with respect to µ. Since
in the model duration increases rapidly as uncertainty increases, heterogeneity across firms in the level of
uncertainty implies that mean durations will exceed median durations.
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Table 4














1970 19 32 21 53 103 37 103 103
1971 152 36 13 49 95 33 129 104
1972 115 46 9 55 94 12 81 92
1973 238 37 12 49 48 20 62 51
1974 324 42 14 56 26 24 37 29
1975 244 41 9 49 23 47 52 28
1976 279 42 16 57 21 29 60 32
1977 362 37 11 49 38 35 50 41
1978 211 39 16 55 22 29 49 30
1979 278 36 13 49 42 33 51 44
1980 349 35 8 43 19 26 68 29
1981 223 45 8 53 23 19 39 26
1982 279 46 7 53 30 26 39 31
1983 362 52 8 60 35 42 65 39
1984 266 52 10 62 28 16 46 31
1985 258 56 11 67 36 24 46 38
1986 317 58 13 71 27 27 43 30
1987 221 67 8 75 41 15 40 41
1988 238 65 9 74 24 31 84 31
1989 249 65 4 69 36 38 52 37
1970–79 2,222 39 13 52 37 29 57 42
1980–89 2,780 53 9 62 30 26 50 33
1970–89 5,002 47 10 57 32 27 53 37
NOTE.–Duration = median duration (days); holdout = contract is signed without strike more than 1 day after contract
expiration; strike = strike occurs before contract is signed; dispute = either strike or holdout occurs before contract is signed;
strike without holdout = strike duration in days, not including prior holdout; and strike with holdout = strike duration in days,
including prior holdout.
The model predicts that the wage change conditional on a strike should be larger than the wage
change conditional on a holdout. This is because the union only selects the strike threat if the higher costs
associated with a strike are made up for by a higher wage. The difference between the wage change given
a strike and given a holdout grows as the strike threat becomes more attractive (an increase in xS, bS, or a
decrease in aS, W0). The wage change given immediate agreement must be higher than the wage change
given a holdout, since immediate agreement implies a nonexercised strike threat or a nonexercised
holdout threat, both of which yield a higher wage than an exercised holdout threat. However, the wage
change given agreement can be either above or below the wage change given a strike, depending on how
frequently the strike threat is chosen. If the strike threat is chosen infrequently, as in the benchmark, then
the wage change given agreement will be below the wage change given a strike. In this case, the wage
change given a strike is greater than the wage change given either an immediate agreement or a holdout.
Card (1990b), Lacroix (1986), McConnell (1989), and Riddell (1980) estimate micro wage equations
using contract data. They find a positive coefficient on a strike indicator variable. This effect, however, is
rarely significant and changes sign in some specifications.
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Card (1990b) and McConnell (1989) estimate the slope of the wage/strike duration concession
function as a test of the asymmetric information bargaining model. This is potentially problematic for
two reasons. First, a downward sloping concession function is implied by only a subset of the bargaining
models. When the firm is uncertain about the union's preferences, then the concession function can be
upward sloping. Second, even when a downward slope is implied by the theory, the magnitude of the
slope can be small and therefore difficult to estimate with much precision. This is especially a problem if
strike costs increase over time (Cramton and Tracy 1993). The rate at which wages decline during a
threat depends primarily on the inefficiency of the threat. Hence, the wage decline during a holdout
should be less than the wage decline during a strike. In addition, the wage decline during a strike will be
small if strike inefficiencies are small (aS large) or if what the union gets during a strike is large relative
to what the firm pays out (-cS large).
V. Empirical Specification of a Bargaining Model
The elasticities for dispute and strike incidence derived from the benchmark model suggest some
empirical regularities that should be present in the micro data. Dispute incidence should be driven by
uncertainty. Strike incidence should be driven by shifts in the composition of disputes between holdout
and strike. This is the key result from introducing the union's threat choice into the model. In this section,
we discuss the empirical specification we use to test these implications.
An inherently difficult parameter to proxy is the level of uncertainty over the firm's willingness to
pay. As in Tracy (1987), we use the standard deviation of the firm's stock return adjusted for the overall
returns in the market. Specifically, we regress the firm's stock return on the market return using a year of
daily trading data ending three months before the contract expiration. The residuals from this regression,
the "excess returns," capture firm-specific events that are capitalized into the stock price. Tracy (1987)
found that bargaining outcomes were more closely related to the variability in a firm's excess returns than
variability in the firm's overall stock returns. This variable has the drawback that it reduces the sample
size, since stock prices are available for only 60% of our contract negotiations. However, we feel that this
loss of data is justified by the need for a firm-specific uncertainty measure.
Gramm, Hendricks, and Kahn (1988) use the dispersion in inflation forecasts contained in the
Livingston Survey as a measure of inflation uncertainty. They show that strike incidence in their data is
higher in periods of greater uncertainty over consumer prices. Our model focuses on the role of
information asymmetries between the firm and the union, and does not deal with issues of common
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uncertainty over macro variables. As such, the model does not provide any predictions about the role of
inflation uncertainty and dispute activity. However, for the purpose of comparison with their findings, we
report results based on a GARCH estimate of inflation uncertainty. We fit the following Garch(1,1)
specification using quarterly inflation data from the second quarter of 1947 to the first quarter of 1991:
We use the estimated conditional standard deviation, σ̂t, as our estimate of the inflation uncertainty at
time t. Figure 3 compares our GARCH uncertainty estimate to the estimate based on the Livingston
Survey for the period covered by their study. The two estimates have a similar time series pattern; the
correlation between the two estimates is 0.71.
Our model suggests that dispute composition will be influenced by prevailing conditions in the labor
markets. We develop several indicators of industry and local employment conditions by using the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) industry and state employment data. We assume that the log quarterly
employment can be represented by a quadratic time trend with quarterly dummy variables to capture
seasonality effects. In addition, we assume the error process is autoregressive with an innovation that is
conditionally heteroscedastic. For each three-digit industry and for each state we fit the following time-
series model:15
15 Our estimates were computed using a two step procedure. First, we used SAS to estimate the autoregressive regression
equation assuming homoscedastic error variances and to transform the data to remove the serial correlation. We then used TSP to
estimate the GARCH regression model.
π β β π β π β π β π εt t t t t t= + + + + +− − − −0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 ,
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We fit the most parsimonious version of this model to each industry and state employment series.
Long-run shifts in the composition of the labor force across industries and regions are proxied by the
estimated employment growth rates. Contemporaneous conditions in the relevant labor market are
measured by the predicted employment residuals. Since workers on strike may not be counted in the
employment figures, we use the predicted rather than the actual employment residual for the quarter that
the contract expired. We also include the inverse of the prime age male unemployment rate as a measure
of aggregate labor market conditions.
The benchmark elasticities suggest that the real wage under the prior contract should be an
important determinant of the composition of disputes. Constructing wage profiles for the contracts in our
sample is a difficult task. The BLS reports wage changes for each contract in issues of the Current Wage
Developments (CWD). The data from 1970 to 1981 were supplied to us by Sheena McConnell. We coded
the data from 1982 to present. The data were then edited for missing or inconsistent payments. The most
common situation involved missing cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) payments. We imputed all missing
COLA payments. When we had information on the structure of the COLA, we used this to carry out the
imputation. In other cases, we regressed the observed COLA payments against the relevant price changes
to estimate a linear approximation to the COLA structure.16 For those bargaining units that still had
missing wage change information, we selected the longest span of contracts with complete wage
coverage to include in our sample.
To construct a wage profile for a bargaining unit, we need a base wage at a point in time. We merged
in base wage information from data collected by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA).Starting from the
effective date of the base wage, we work backwards in time using the wage change information to infer
the base wage at the start of the first contract we observe for that bargaining unit.17 We then work
forwards calculating the actual and base wage for each month covered by the contracts for that
bargaining unit. For many bargaining units, we observe more than one base wage from the BNA. In these
cases, we construct a separate wage profile for each base wage, and then average the profiles to form a
summary profile. For those bargaining units without a base wage from the BNA, we use the BLS
December average wage for that bargaining unit's four digit industry classification for each year that
16 For a subset of our contracts, we were able to impute zero COLAs using correspondence between Wayne Vroman and the
BLS that listed missing COLA payments that were nonpayments due to caps or triggers.
17 The algorithm takes into account the fact that COLA payments typically are not rolled into the base wage until the end of a
contract. Some wage concessions take the form of only rolling in a portion of the COLA float at the end of the contract. We
account for this whenever it is reported in CWD.
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contracts are in effect.
The model predicts that dispute activity is a function of the union's relative uncertainty over its value
added under a labor contract. This value added will be influenced by the presence of economic rents in
the industry. Holding constant the variability in the economic rents, lowering the general level of rents
will add to the degree of relative uncertainty. Increased international competition through the opening up
of product markets is one force that will compete away economic rents. We control for the impact of
growing international competition on bargaining by using time-series data on the magnitude of imports.
Import penetration data were developed by Abowd (1991) and are discussed in Abowd and Freeman
(1991). The import penetration ratio is defined to be the import Standard Industrial Classification -(SIC)-
based value of imports divided by the comparable value of domestic product shipments plus the value of
imports. Abowd's series are disaggregated to the four digit SIC classifications and run from 1958 to 1987.
We extrapolate the data to 1989.
Dispute activity may also be influenced by the structure of unionization in an industry. The nature of
unionism in the industry can affect the relative inefficiency imposed on the firm during a strike or a
holdout. We model the structure of unionization in an industry as a function of the union density in the
industry and the degree of concentration in the union membership across different unions. Firms in
highly unionized industries are more likely themselves to be highly unionized. This limits the ability of
the firm to offset any inefficiencies imposed by a bargaining unit at one plant through shifting production
to its other plants. Industries with a high concentration of union membership may be more prone to union
practices of pattern bargaining. Pattern bargaining should lead to lower overall dispute rates, because the
union can target the dispute against a single firm. Assuming private information is correlated among the
firms in the pattern, pattern bargaining economizes on disputes.
Following Abowd and Tracy (1989), we adjust our measures of industry unionization rates to reflect
the implicit labor content in imported goods. By definition, this labor content is protected from the threat
of unionization by U.S. labor unions. The adjusted union density is defined to be the unadjusted union
density multiplied by one minus the import penetration ratio. The unadjusted union densities are derived
from the collective bargaining agreements (see Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1993) for a description of the
methodology). We use a Herfindahl index of individual union coverage rates to control for the degree of
concentration of union membership in an industry.
The final two variables that we include in our empirical specifications are the size of the bargaining
unit and the capital intensity of the firm. Although our data are restricted to bargaining units of at least a
thousand workers, there is considerable variation in size across bargaining units. Large bargaining units
may be better positioned to impose higher inefficiencies on a firm in a strike threat. One possible reason
is that it becomes more difficult for the firm to find sufficient numbers of temporary replacements.
Similarly, the inefficiency during a strike may be less in firms that employ a highly capital intensive
method of production. To the extent that capital intensity is related to the degree of automation in the
production process, managers can step in during a strike to keep the plant running. We measure the
capital intensity using the current ratio of capital to labor as reported in Compustat.
VI. Determinants of Dispute Incidence and Composition
We estimate three logit models: (1) the probability of a dispute given a contract negotiation, (2) the
probability of a strike given a dispute, and (3) the probability of a strike given a contract negotiation. We
standardize the continuous right-hand-side variables to have zero mean and unit standard deviation to
facilitate comparing magnitudes across different variables. Summary statistics on the unstandardized data
are given in Table 5. Tables 6 and 7 report the marginal effects implied by logit coefficients for the
dispute incidence and dispute composition. The marginal effects measure the change in the relevant
probability from a one standard deviation change in the underlying control variables. We give results for
our basic specification with and without controlling for two-digit industry fixed effects, and estimated
separately for the pre and post 1981 time period. We will discuss the pre and post 1981 results in the next









Size of Bargaining Unit (1,000 workers) 5.98 27.42 0.74 462
Capital/Labor ($1,000/worker) 0.07 0.45 0.002 7.77
State Employment Growth Rate (%) 0.53 0.20 0.16 1.29
Industry Employment Growth Rate (%) -0.14 0.44 -1.74 2.11
State Predicted Employment Residual (%) 0.47 3.82 -10.45 15.08
Industry Predicted Employment Residual
(%)
-0.02 8.56 -31.66 62.27
Inverse Prime Age Male Unemployment
Rate
0.18 0.05 0.10 0.33
Inflation Uncertainty 0.27 0.11 0.09 0.51
Stock Price Uncertainty 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.05
Import Penetration Ratio 0.10 0.10 0.0 0.86
Import Adjusted Percent of Industry
Unionized 23.06 18.67 0.03 91.28
Union Concentration 0.54 0.25 0.11 1.00
Percent Real Wage Change During Prior
Contract -4.22 7.37 -37.91 38.84
Sample Size 1,114
We define a "dispute" as any negotiation that involves either a strike of any duration or a holdout of
more than one day. This definition is motivated by a pronounced deadline effect around the contract
expiration. The settlement rate sharply rises at the contract expiration date and the following day. The
settlement rate is 15% on the contract expiration date and 24% on the following day. By the second day
following the contract expiration, the daily settlement rate falls to 4% and slowly declines to around 2%
over the next week. By requiring a holdout duration of more than one day, we exclude from our measure
of disputes those cases that settled at the contract expiration but were not ratified until the next day. (The
settlement date reported by the BLS is the date the new contract is ratified by the union membership.)
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Industry Fixed Effects included
No Yes No No
Sample Size 1,212 1,212 649 563
-2 log likelihood 1,617 1,531 850 744
NOTE.— Standardized logistic marginal effects are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.
Despite our efforts to restrict the definition of a dispute to the most likely candidates, some short
holdouts may be misclassified as disputes. Misclassifying disputes is a problem in that it will bias the
coefficient estimates toward zero. To investigate the possibility of misclassification, we estimate a
generalized logistic model. The generalized logistic model includes parameters that represent the
probability that a holdout of a specific duration is a dispute. We estimate versions allowing
misclassification of holdouts from two to five days in duration. For these short holdouts, the contribution
to the likelihood is a weighted average of the likelihood given that the negotiation is classified as a
dispute and the likelihood given that the negotiation is classified as a settlement. The weight is estimated
as a parameter. In all cases, the data indicate that 100% of holdouts with short durations should be
classified as disputes. Given this finding, we report estimates derived from a standard logistic model.
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Percent Real Wage Change








Industry Fixed Effects included
No Yes No No
Sample Size 659 659 346 313
-2 log likelihood 763 708 416 321
NOTE.— Standardized logistic marginal effects are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.
The model suggests that a useful way to study strike incidence is by separately looking at dispute
incidence and the composition of disputes between strikes and holdouts. The model implies low
elasticities of dispute incidence associated with all parameters except for the union's uncertainty over the
value added from a settlement. To the extent that our stock price uncertainty measure is a good proxy for
this source of uncertainty, dispute incidence should be positively related to our firm-specific uncertainty
measure. Table 6 gives logistic marginal effects for the probability of a dispute. We find for the full
sample period that dispute incidence is higher for firms experiencing more variability in their excess
returns. However, this relationship is neither large in magnitude nor precisely measured. A one standard
deviation increase in our uncertainty measure is related to about a 1.5 percentage point increase in
dispute rates. As we will discuss in detail in the next section, the impact of uncertainty on dispute
incidence has changed dramatically between the 1970s and the 1980s. The model's prediction is strongly
supported by negotiations carried out before 1982. However, post 1981 there is no evidence of a positive
connection between variability in excess returns and disputes. In contrast, we find no evidence of a
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positive association between inflation uncertainty and labor disputes for either the 1970s or the 1980s.
Table 8
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Industry Fixed Effects included
No Yes No No
Sample Size 1,212 1,212 649 563
-2 log likelihood 1,029 983 596 410
NOTE.— Standardized logistic marginal effects are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.
The largest marginal effect is for the size of the bargaining unit. A one standard deviation increase in
the size of the bargaining unit is associated with about a 30 percentage point increase in the likelihood of
a dispute. As specifications (3) and (4) indicate, the impact of bargaining unit size on dispute rates has
increased from the 1970s to the 1980s.
Two of the remaining variables have a significant relation to dispute activity. We find that disputes
are more likely to occur in tight local labor markets. Both higher trend rates of employment growth in the
state as well as current employment above trend are associated with higher levels of dispute activity. In
addition, a dispute is more likely following a contract where there has been little erosion in the real wage.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of industry effects.
A key prediction of the model is that swings in strike incidence should be related to shifts in the
composition of disputes. The benchmark model yields high elasticities for the impact of the model's
parameters on dispute composition. In particular, the model implies that the composition should shift
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toward strikes the lower the real wage growth under the prior contract and the tighter the labor market
conditions. To test this we estimate a logit model of the probability of a strike conditional on a labor
dispute.
Table 7 gives the logistic marginal effects for the probability of a strike given a dispute. We find that
real wage growth is consistently associated with a shift away from strikes. For the full sample, this effect
is precisely measured when we include industry effects. A one standard deviation increase in the real
wage measure is associated with nearly a three percentage point shift in the composition of disputes away
from strikes. Similar to our earlier finding on uncertainty and dispute incidence, we find that the prior
real wage effect is pronounced in negotiations before 1982 and switches signs in the post 1981 period.
The data also provide some weak support for the prediction that tight aggregate and industry labor
market conditions shift the composition of disputes toward strikes. The magnitude and precision of the
employment effects are much lower in the overall sample than in the pre 1981 sample. There is no
evidence that deviations in state employment around trend have any impact on the composition of
disputes. However, unions negotiating contracts in states with higher employment growth rates are less
likely to select the strike threat.
The structure of union organization is also an important determinant of the composition of disputes.
Holding constant the extent of union organization in the industry, increasing the concentration of the
organization across different unions is associated with a shift away from strikes. The magnitude of this
effect is quite large. A one standard deviation change in the Herfindhal index is associated with a five
percentage point change in the dispute composition.
VII. Evidence of a Structural Change in Bargaining
We see from the previous section that the relationship between stock price uncertainty and dispute
incidence and between real wage changes and dispute composition are strong in the 1970s, and then
disappear in the 1980s. This raises the general question of the stability over time of the empirical
specification. The 1980s was a difficult decade for private sector unions in the United States. Proponents
of amendments to the labor law that would prohibit firms from using replacement workers argue that
there has been a fundamental change in bargaining practices following the demise of the air-traffic
controllers' union PATCO in 1981. The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO in a 1986 manual
for union leaders titled The Inside Game: Winning With Workplace Strategies argue that the threat of
permanent replacement has significantly diminished the attractiveness of the strike threat relative to the
holdout threat: “To be sure, the strike in many cases is still a powerful and effective weapon. But when
an employer begins trying to play by the ‘new rules’ and actually forces a strike, staying on the job and
working from the inside may be more appropriate and effective” (p. 5, emphasis in original). In this
section, we present a variety of tests of the null hypothesis that the structure of bargaining as reflected in
our empirical model has been stable in the pre- and post- 1981 period.
Figure 4 shows the actual annual dispute incidence and the predicted annual dispute incidence based
on the logit results in specification (1) of Table 6. The empirical model does a reasonable job of tracking
the decline in dispute activity in the early 1980s. However, the model significantly under predicts the
dispute incidence between 1985 and 1988. Overall, though, the model does capture the basic time series
behavior in disputes.
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Without controlling for any covariates, dispute incidence in the post 1981 period is only 2.3
percentage points higher than in the earlier period, an insignificant difference. Once we control for
changes in the underlying covariates, the difference increases to 7.5 percentage points and is significant.
If we replace the post 1981 indicator with separate year effects for 1982 to 1989, we find the year effects
are jointly significant although only 1986 is individually significant. The point estimate indicates that the
actual dispute rate was 27 percentage points higher than predicted in 1986. The χ2 statistic for the joint
significance of the year effects is 21.9 with a probability value of 0.005.
Turning to the composition of disputes, Figure 5 shows the actual annual fraction of disputes
involving a strike and the predicted annual rates based on the logit results in specification (1) of Table 7.
The empirical model tracks the shift in composition away from strikes in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
However, the model predicts a trend upward in the use of the strike threat beginning in 1986 when the
actual upswing did not occur until 1988.
Without controlling for any covariates, the fraction of disputes involving a strike is 13 percentage
points lower in the post 1981 period, a significant difference. When we control for the covariates, the
difference falls to 7.5 percentage points and is only marginally significant. Replacing the post 1981
indicator with year effects, we find that the year effects are jointly insignificant and that 1989 is the only
year that is individually significant. The point estimate indicates that the actual fraction of disputes
involving a strike was 18 percentage points lower than predicted in 1989.
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The data provide more evidence of a shift in the level of dispute activity than a shift in the
composition of dispute activity in the 1980s. Comparing specifications (3) and (4) of Tables 6 and 7 also
suggest that changes have occurred in the responsiveness of disputes to the underlying economic
environment. To test this, we interacted each variable with a post 1981 indicator. The χ2 statistic
(probability value) for the joint significance of the intercept and slope interactions in the dispute
incidence specification is 19.7 (0.10), and for the slope interactions alone is 16.0 (0.25). While the
interactions are jointly insignificant, the stock price uncertainty measure is individually significant. This
is the key interaction from the viewpoint of the theory. The data indicate a reduction in the marginal
effect associated with our uncertainty measure of 7 percentage points between the pre and post 1981
period, with a t-statistic of around 2.3.
Although the data do not indicate any significant overall reduction in the fraction of disputes
involving a strike in the post 1981 period, there is more evidence of changes in the responsiveness of the
threat choice to the economic environment. The χ2 statistic (probability value) for the joint significance
of the intercept and slope interactions in the dispute composition specification is 26.1 (0.02), and for the
slope interactions alone is 23.4 (0.02). The interactions on the industry employment residual and real
wage change are both individually significant. The key interaction from the viewpoint of the theory is
with the real wage effect. The data indicate an increase in the marginal effect of 13 percentage points
between the pre and post 1981 period, with a t-statistic of 2.9.
The threat of replacement workers reduces the relative attractiveness of the strike threat. If this
threat was more pronounced in the post 1981 period, it would manifest itself in the dispute composition
specification.18 Our data provide mixed evidence on the potential importance of replacements. On the one
hand, there is little systematic evidence that the overall composition of disputes in the post 1981 period
shifted away from strikes. However, there is strong evidence that the responsiveness of the threat choice
to the underlying economic environment changed after 1981, perhaps because of a shift in the employer's
bargaining tactics. If the use of permanent replacements is highest among firms negotiating wage
concessions in the 1980s, and if some of these concessions (at least in real terms) occur during the prior
contract, then we would expect fewer strikes in response to a real wage drop in the post 1981 period.
18 One explanation for a greater use of permanent replacements in the 1980s is the large increase in union wage premiums.
Wachter and Carter (1989) estimate that the union wage premium roughly doubled from the 1970s to the 1980s.
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Erosion of the real wage becomes a signal of concessionary bargaining and a heightened risk of
replacement that significantly reduces the attractiveness of the strike threat. Further progress on this issue
requires data on the threatened and actual use of replacement workers, which as yet is unavailable.
VIII. Conclusion
An important feature of U.S. labor contract negotiations is that most labor disputes do not involve a
strike. If the contract expiration date is reached without a settlement, most bargaining units continue to
negotiate under the terms of the expired contract, which we call holdout. We present a strategic
bargaining model of labor contract negotiations that incorporates the union's threat choice—strike or
holdout. The model makes predictions about the overall level of dispute activity and the form that
disputes will take. The model predicts that the level of dispute activity is driven by the level of
uncertainty over the value added by the union labor under a new contract. In addition, the model predicts
that the composition of disputes will shift toward strikes when the real wage falls during the prior
contract and when labor market conditions are tight.
We test these predictions by estimating logit models of the incidence and composition of labor
disputes using U.S. data from 1970 to 1989. We find empirical support for the model's key predictions,
but that these associations are much weaker in the post 1981 period. An interpretation of these findings is
that the threat of permanent replacements in the post 1981 period may have diminished the relative
attractiveness of the strike threat.
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